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Compensation packages are widely used to motivate top executives. Dispersion in pay 
levels among a firm’s executives can trigger two antithetic effects, social comparison and 
individual motivation, with unclear implications for firm performance. We focus on 
innovation activities, one important channel through which pay dispersion affects firm 
performance. We find that executive pay dispersion acts as a double-edged sword: on the 
one hand, dispersion in variable pay significantly increases innovation; on the other hand, 
dispersion in fixed pay depresses innovation. Results are robust to a number of tests, 
including considering cash pay only, and restricting the analysis to executives with direct 
responsibility for innovation projects.  
 











Monetary incentives have long been considered the cornerstone instrument to motivate top 





compensation schemes can be tailored to increase executives’ commitment towards long-
term projects (Balkin et al., 2000; Lerner and Wulf, 2007; Manso, 2013) and better align 
managers’ and shareholders’ interests (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985). However, the 
literature has provided mixed evidence on the nexus between monetary incentives and task 
performance; results have been shown to vary depending on the nature of the task, context 
characteristics and compensation schemes (Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002). 
 Building on the view that top executives often operate as teams rather than isolated 
individuals, a growing literature focuses on the dispersion of pay within a firm’s top 
executive team (Bushman et al. 2016). Pay dispersion is crucial for executives’ decision-
making because it creates reference points for each executive to assess his/her own 
compensation package. Unfortunately, there is limited and contradictory evidence on the 
corporate implications of executive pay dispersion: some scholars have shown negative 
effects on firm performance (Bloom, 1999; Jaskiewicz et al., 2016; Siegel and Hambrick, 
2005; Carpenter and Sanders, 2004) while others have found that it may beneficial for 
companies (Kale et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2008). From an empirical standpoint, while 
several studies have explored executive pay dispersion on accounting and stock market 
returns, the specific mechanisms through which pay inequality influences firm 
performance are still largely unknown. 
 One such mechanism, increasingly under scrutiny in the accounting literature (e.g., 
Koh and Reeb, 2015; Plumlee et al., 2015; Lin and Wang, 2017), is a firm’s innovation 
policy. Successful technological innovations are typically the result of interconnected 
work at the apex of companies (Siegel and Hambrick, 2005), and are thus particularly 
sensitive to mechanisms that alter the individuals’ propensity to share knowledge and 
cooperate for a common organizational goal. However, until now, it is not clear how pay 





gap by investigating the relationship between the configuration of pay dispersion within 
the top executive team and the firm’s innovation activities.  
 We consider both the configuration of pay elements (Trevor et al., 2012) and their 
degree of legitimization or normative acceptance (Shaw et al., 2002). Accordingly, we 
posit that the distribution of executive rewards through pay dispersion is likely to affect 
innovation by means of two antithetic forces: i) incentives to organizational commitment 
and effort provision, when pay dispersion is likely to be perceived as legitimate and 
accepted; and ii) obstacles to cooperation and knowledge sharing, increment in conflicts 
and thus harmful consequences for activities requiring coordinated work effort, in a 
contingence of weak legitimization of the pay dispersion. Borrowing from further 
observations that pay contingencies influence individuals’ task performance (Pazy and 
Ganzach, 2009), we take into consideration whether or not pay is tied to individual effort 
by differentiating between fixed and variable pay elements. To our knowledge, this is the 
first attempt to integrate the conflicting views of pay disparity and its impact on 
innovation by separately analyzing the fixed and variable components of executive pay 
dispersion. Building on existing studies about executive pay dispersion and its impact on 
firm outcomes (Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002; Rankin and Sayre, 2011; Bushman et al., 
2016), we posit that a larger dispersion in variable pay (i.e. pay more closely tied to 
individual effort) is relatively more likely to be perceived as justified, and would thus 
positively impact on the innovation activities conducted by the executive team. By 
contrast, high dispersion in fixed pay is relatively more likely to trigger the negative 
effects of social comparisons and ultimately hurt innovation outcomes: being less 
dependent from individual contributions, high fixed pay dispersion is likely to be 





harmful for effort provision and motivation, interpersonal cooperation and knowledge 
sharing. 
 We conduct the empirical analysis on a panel of US listed firms for the period 
1992-2006. Following a consolidated approach in the literature (e.g. Griliches, 1990; Hall 
et al., 2001, 2005), we measure innovation activities using patent metrics. Consistent with 
our hypotheses, we find that fixed and variable executive pay dispersions have statistically 
significant effects of opposite sign: higher dispersion in fixed executive pay leads to worse 
innovation outcomes (i.e. fewer granted patents and less forward citations), whereas 
higher dispersion in variable executive pay leads to more innovation.  
 We address potential concerns about confounding mechanisms with additional 
analyses focusing on executives directly in charge of innovation: computing our pay 
dispersion measures based on these executives reinforces our confidence about the 
channels through which pay dispersion influences innovation. Also, to validate that 
investment in innovation inputs is a key mechanism behind our results, we show that fixed 
pay dispersion is associated with lower R&D expenditures, whereas variable pay 
dispersion is associated with greater R&D expenditures. Finally, we document that our 
finding on variable pay is mainly driven by dispersion in pay items such as cash bonuses 
that are mostly attributable to individual task performance rather than firm performance at 
large.  
Our paper contributes to various streams of research. First, we extend recent 
insights on the role of corporate governance and executive compensation schemes in 
innovative firms (e.g. Bebchuk et al., 2011; Bhojraj et al., 2017; Manso, 2013; Kale et al., 
2009). For instance, Ederer and Manso (2013) find that to promote innovation an ideal 
compensation package should provide a combination of tolerance for early failure and 





goes beyond the analysis of compensation for given executives considered in isolation (e.g. 
Carpenter and Sanders, 2002), and thus provide one of the first investigations on the nexus 
between corporate innovation and configurations of executive pay dispersion. As such, our 
work also complements recent studies (e.g. Lim, 2015) that emphasize the importance of 
relative CEO compensation from a temporal perspective (i.e., negative or positive 
deviations from past compensation) for a firm’s innovation expenditures. 
Second, our study contributes to the debate (Bushman et al., 2016; Ridge et al., 
2015; Shaw et al. 2002; Trevor et al. 2012) seeking to reconcile the literature on the 
“bright side” of pay dispersion, arguing that it may be a powerful device to motivate 
managers via tournament incentives (Kale et al., 2009), with the literature on the “dark 
side” of pay dispersion, which delineates negative corporate consequences due to social 
comparisons (Carpenter and Sanders, 2004; Fredrickson et al., 2010; Pepper and Gore, 
2015) and poor corporate governance (Bebchuk et al., 2011). Our contribution here is to 
demonstrate that these positive and negative effects may well co-exist within the context 
of firm innovation depending on the type of pay dispersion. By considering the variable 
and fixed components of pay inequality and isolating the effects of these components on 
firm innovation, we significantly extend Yanadori and Cui (2013), who explore the 
innovation implications of pay dispersion among R&D workers, as well as Sharma (2011) 
and Jia et al. (2016), who focus on top executives but do not disentangle the antithetic 
innovation effects of dispersion in variable and fixed pay items. 
 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
2.1. Executive pay dispersion: Incentivizing device or trigger of social comparisons? 
While there is a consensus that executive pay dispersion can shape executive actions (e.g. 





on the direction of such impact are conflicting. On the one hand, existing studies have 
explained how pay dispersion can be leveraged to serve as an effective incentivizing 
device. This perspective builds on the notion of tournament systems, i.e. compensation 
configurations that by entailing some degree of pay inequality increase the motivation of 
managers and workers (Lazear, 1988). The incentives arising from tournaments can have 
positive repercussions for a broad set of corporate activities such as R&D investment 
(Kini and Williams, 2012) and ultimately firm performance (Kale et al., 2009). 
 Other streams of research highlight incentive problems in tournaments (e.g. Sayre 
et al., 1998; Rankin and Sayre, 2011), and show that tournament performance depends on 
such conditions as the size of the “winner proportion”, prize structures and group identity 
(e.g. Newman and Tafkov, 2014; Kelly and Presslee, 2017). Adopting an agency 
perspective, Bebchuk et al. (2011) illustrate a negative relationship between the share of 
total executive pay captured by the CEO (her/his “pay slice”) and firm performance, likely 
as a result of managerial entrenchment. It has also been emphasized that behavioral 
aspects play a key role in shaping the outcome of pay dispersion (Pepper and Gore, 2015). 
Dating back to Festinger (1954), social comparison theory has suggested that individuals 
evaluate their own characteristics with reference to peers with whom they share similar 
traits, occupations etc. (Newman and Tafkov, 2014, Nickerson and Zenger, 2008). Recent 
studies (e.g. Carpenter and Sanders, 2004; Ridge et al., 2017) adopt this framework to 
understand how executive pay dispersion can affect work relationships among firm 
executives. Evidence from this research suggests that receiving a much lower pay than 
given peers can trigger negative feelings of inequity, which in turn dampen effort 
provision and motivation, reduce organizational commitment (Fredrickson et al., 2010; 
Trevor and Wazeter, 2006) and create obstacles to cooperation and knowledge sharing 





will undermine the whole effectiveness of decision-making processes in firms (Cohn et al., 
2014). 
 As Trevor et al. (2012) point out, the conflicting evidence on the positive or 
negative effects of pay dispersion can be ascribed to one particular shortcoming in the 
main theoretical frameworks adopted, i.e. the implicit connection between unequal pay 
allocation and its perceived inequity. Indeed, unequal pay allocation does not necessarily 
imply inequity, and may even be perceived as equitable if the pay is tied to productive 
contributions of useful inputs (Shaw et al., 2002). Building on these considerations, we 
argue that the two competing effects related to pay dispersion can be disentangled by 
considering the multi-faceted nature of executive pay. Accordingly, we jointly examine 
the combination of the level of pay dispersion (i.e. the ratio of compensation for the 
highest and the lowest paid executive) and the forms of executive pay (i.e. the fixed and 
variable components). This approach makes it possible to pinpoint the two antithetic 
effects that pay dispersion exerts on innovation activities: i) incentivizing device; ii) 
determinant of social comparison. 
Building on Shaw et al. (2002), we consider variable pay as the set of pay items 
that links the compensation of executives to their work contributions and productivity 
(after accounting for firm-specific factors). In contrast, we consider fixed pay as those 
items less explicitly tied to individuals’ current productivity, which, as such, and may to 
some extent be attributed to factors such as favoritism, politics, or even randomness. It 
follows, that social comparisons would primarily exert a negative effect due to large fixed 
pay dispersion. In a similar context, lower-paid executives may be more prone to perceive 
a high CEO fixed pay as unfair and undeserved, legitimized by political power and status 
rather than individual effort (Finkelstein, 1992; Shaw et al., 2002; Trevor et al. 2012). 





sense of inequity, and the legitimization of such pay schemes is likely to be low (Trevor et 
al., 2012; Shaw et al., 2002). On the contrary, high pay variability justified by differences 
in subjective contributions to broader organizational goals would not have per se negative 
consequences for innovation given its higher degree of legitimization and acceptance.  
 
2.2. Executive pay dispersion, inequity, and firm innovation 
The decision processes related to firm innovation can be viewed as a combination and 
synthesis of different paradoxical cognitions (Smith and Tushman, 2005). Without such 
cognitive conflicts – i.e. conflicts among different viewpoints – the quality of these 
processes suffers (Amason, 1996). Cognitive conflict is therefore a key element for 
effective executives’ decision-making. Under the circumstance of high dispersion in fixed 
pay, we expect the conflict to be more likely of the form of affective conflict, which is 
“emotional and focused on personal incompatibilities and disputes” (Amason, 1996 p:129) 
and therefore dysfunctional to the quality of decisions, including those directly concerning 
innovation. Affective conflict is likely to negatively impact on complex decisions such 
innovation activities, which are characterized by high task interdependence and strong 
coordination. Further, higher fixed pay dispersion is likely to obstacle a fluid flow of 
information within the top executives (West and Anderson, 1996; Henderson and 
Frederickson 2001), a contingency particularly negative for innovation which crucially 
hinges on information sharing (Siegel and Hambrick, 2005). The right understanding of 
complex projects such as those regarding innovation is key to generate successful 
outcomes. Ultimately, investments in R&D – which need a high degree of information 
exchange and coordination – are hampered where affective conflict is prevalent and where 





basis of affective conflicts and limited information sharing, the possibility of investing at 
the margin into better R&D is lower.  
 In sum, we expect high dispersion in fixed pay to weaken motivation and effort 
provision. Lower-paid executives cannot directly fill the pay gap relative to the higher-
paid peers by working harder (since fixed pay is not directly related to current effort). 
They are less likely to engage in tasks requiring coordination and to share resources and 
knowledge. Affective conflicts and obstacles to information sharing will be more likely to 
occur, thereby significantly impacting the process of R&D investments and thus 
innovation outcomes, with an overall detrimental effect for the firm. 
Hypothesis 1. Greater dispersion in fixed executive pay is negatively associated 
with innovation. 
 Due to its greater contingency upon individual task performance (particularly in 
the case of individual bonuses), dispersion in variable pay is less likely to be perceived as 
inequitable or non-legitimate, and instead tends to be justified by differences in individual 
work effort or objective success (Cohn et al., 2014). Contrary to fixed pay dispersion, a 
lower level of affective conflict is expected to arise when differences in executive 
compensation occur in the form of variable pay. This, in turn, improves innovation-related 
decision-making, which requires the integration of top executives’ views and expertise. 
Also, dispersion in variable pay may induce stronger incentives to exert effort. Observing 
that peers receive higher compensation in terms of variable pay would induce lower-paid 
executives’ to increase commitment and effort provision (Newman and Tafkov, 2014) in 
order to secure similar compensation packages and rewards (and thus fill the pay gap with 
higher-paid colleagues). In other words, dispersion in monetary compensation tied to 
individual inputs would incentivize greater effort, since agents do not perceive that their 





be particularly beneficial for innovation, since higher executive effort is likely to be 
increase engagement with R&D projects and development of new products and services. 
The beneficial effect of better coordination and information sharing are also likely to be 
reflected in the increased quality and complexity of R&D investments. 
 In connection to innovation-related activities and the decisions regarding R&D, i.e. 
under circumstances characterized by higher profit uncertainty, learning by doing enables 
a virtuous circle between profitability-uncertainty and incentives: “greater effort, induced 
by high-powered incentives, leads to more informative signals about uncertain project 
profitability, improving the firm’s future investment decisions” (He et al., 2014). Higher 
levels of effort are thus likely to have a positive impact on a firm’s innovative output, 
which consists of projects whose profitability is uncertain a priory. Compensation 
packages with important components of variable pay also motivate managers to focus on 
growth (Jaskiewitz et al., 2016), which can be achieved organically through higher 
innovation efforts and the introduction of new products and services.  
 Perceived justice is another characteristic function of the pay configuration likely 
to impact firm innovation. Perceived justice (i.e. equitable distribution but not necessarily 
equal) of the pay structure has a strong impact on the dynamics of team interactions. 
Breugst et al. (2014) show that when the members of a team perceive high distributional 
justice, they are likely to experience the feeling of belonging to a strong entity, and the 
dynamics associated to the dissolution of teams would decrease substantially. High gaps in 
variable pay are expected to be perceived as accepted and just, and thus decrease the 
emergence of affective conflict while improving the quality of top managers’ decisions, 
including those related to R&D projects. Further, team cohesion improves the flow of 





 Investment decisions regarding complex R&D projects are expected to be more 
effective if the incentive system promotes the prevalence of cognitive conflict, effort 
provision, information sharing and learning, team cohesion among top executives. Overall, 
we expect that the incentivizing effects of variable pay dispersion will promote managerial 
effort and thereby high quality learning, and desirable team dynamics, which would 
ultimately result in greater innovation output.  
  Hypothesis 2. Greater dispersion in variable executive pay is positively associated 
with innovation. 
 
3. Data and variables 
3.1. Sample 
Our sample comes from three different reliable data sources widely used in previous 
empirical research. We gather patent data from the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) patent dataset. The NBER patent dataset is a comprehensive source of 
information for all patents granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and 
all citations made to these patents starting from 1976 and up to 2006 (Hall et al., 2001). 
Executive compensation data come from the Standard&Poors’ Execucomp database, 
which contains information on the top executives of a large set of US listed companies. 
Specifically, Execucomp provides, for all the 5-top executives of a given firm (though a 
few firms report data for more than 5), data on the various items forming executive pay 
packages as well as a few demographic characteristics such as executive age and tenure in 
the company. This approach is consistent with many existing works (e.g., Fredrickson et 
al., 2010), which have studied the importance of social comparisons among members of 
the CEO’s top team.  Finally, firm-level accounting data come from the Compustat 





in Bessen (2009). We select a time-period spanning from 1992 (i.e. the first year available 
in the Execucomp dataset) through 2006 (i.e. the last year for which we have citation data 
from the NBER patent dataset). 
 
3.2. Dependent variables 
Due to the high uncertainty between executives’ action and firm performance in dynamic 
environments, financial incentives for high-technology firms top executives tend to be 
loosely linked to observed firm performance, but are significantly intertwined to 
measurable innovation efforts (e.g. Balkin et al., 2000): for this reason, we focus on patent 
metrics to assess such effort.  
Consistent with the innovation literature, we construct two measures of innovation that 
will be used as dependent variables. The first, patent counts, is the raw number of patents 
granted to a firm in a given year. Given the typical average lag between application and 
granting years, we follow the literature (e.g., Hall et al., 2005) and date patent counts at 
the time of the patent application, which better reflects the actual time of innovation. 
While this variable measures the raw output of a firm’s innovation effort, it is well known 
that patents vary greatly in their economic and technological importance. To better 
account for these differences, we again follow the existing literature (e.g. Hall et al., 2005) 
and adopt the number of forward citations received by a firm’s patents (citation counts), 
which offer a precise and reliable proxy for the economic and technological importance of 
patents (Jaffe et al., 2000; Hall et al., 2005). Consistent with the literature, we mitigate the 
usual problem of truncation (i.e. that patents filed at a later stage have less time to be 
cited) by adjusting citations using the weights provided by the NBER.  
 





We proceed by constructing the key measures of executive compensation dispersion. To 
this end, in accordance with existing works (e.g. Connelly et al., 2016), we start by 
collecting data on the various items of executive compensation packages, such as base 
salary, cash bonuses, restricted stock granted, the Black-Scholes value of stock options 
granted, and other long-term incentive payouts.  
 We then distinguish between fixed and variable pay items. As measure of fixed 
compensation we use the base fixed salary (Cohen et al., 2012), which is usually specified 
in the employment contract and remains constant over a period of time. In order to 
quantify the variable amount of executive pay, we take the sum of cash bonuses (typically 
representing a variable compensation on an annual basis), restricted stock granted and 
Black-Scholes value of stock options granted (reflecting the long-run component of 
variable pay). Both of these measures are in line with the literature on CEO incentives (e.g. 
Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Cohen et al., 2012). One concern of including stock 
options in the variable pay is that, contrary to our theory, stock options might not 
necessarily relate to past effort and individual performance but could be intended instead 
as motivational tools to engage executives to perform well in the future, being driven by 
company results rather than individual-level performance. To avoid this potential concern, 
we conduct additional analyses where variable pay is only measured with cash-based 
bonuses, a pay component more directly linked to current and individual-level task 
performance.  
 Next, we measure the dispersion in fixed and variable pay. Extant empirical 
research is fragmented and no clear consensus exists on how to measure pay dispersion. 
We operationalize pay dispersion by means of a ratio, which is consistent with prior works. 
For instance, Connelly et al. (2016), who adopt the ratio of TMT pay to average worker 





measure “multidimensional constructs in which variations in one variable are theoretically 
meaningful with reference to variations in the other” and that “pay dispersion is 
operationalized as theoretically prescribed ratio” (pg. 10-11).  
Following these indications, we take the ratio between the compensation of the 
executive with the highest pay and the compensation of the executive with the lowest pay 
as reported in Execucomp (notice that we do not use the Gini index to avoid potential 
biases arising from the limited number of executives; Deltas, 2003). In order to separate 
out the effect of dispersion in fixed and variable pay components, we then compute three 
versions of this ratio, i.e. based on (1) total compensation (total compensation gap); (2) 
fixed compensation only (fixed compensation gap); and (3) variable compensation only 
(variable compensation gap). Given the presence of a few extreme values, possibly 
outliers due to e.g. temporary executive appointments, we trim observations in the 
bottom/top 0.5% of the distribution of each ratio. Finally, please notice that to improve 
table readability the pay gaps have been divided by 100. 
Our measure has several appealing features. First, it accounts for the structure of 
the whole executive team (not just the CEO or CFO) thereby mirroring also the pay 
strategies applicable to R&D managers (Balkin et al., 2000). Second, data on the 
composition of pay packages allow us to directly and precisely account for the different 
structure of incentives in place. Third, our ratio draws on accurate and reliable data, it 
does not need any arbitrary algebraic transformation, and it has an intuitive interpretation: 
it takes value of 1 if the highest and the lowest executive pay are the same, whereas values 
above 1 indicate the degree to which the compensation of the most paid executive exceeds 
the one of the executive with lowest pay. Fourth, our measure is constructed using 
information on the pay of key decision-makers with crucial influence on the business (and 





To be more precise on this point, we fine-tune the computation of the ratio 
exploiting the information on the job title of each executive. To this end, we conduct a 
textual analysis of each reported job title and for each firm identify the executive manager 
explicitly and formally responsible for innovation activities. Specifically, we identify 
executives explicitly involved in innovation activities by searching within each job title 
the following words: Innovation, Innovative, Knowledge, Laboratory, Product, R&D, 
Research, Science, Scientist, Scientific, Technology, and Technological. Then, in an 
additional test we employ the ratio between the pay of the highest paid executive and the 
pay of the executive in charge of innovation activities. This is to ensure that we capture 
unambiguously the effect of pay dispersion on firm innovation. Moreover, this ratio 
explicitly incorporates the effort of the executive responsible for innovation activities, 
which we argue to be shaped by pay dispersion configurations. After dropping 
observations with missing data in the key dependent and explanatory variables, we obtain 
a sample of 1,137 unique firms for 6,176 firm-year observations.  
 
3.4. Control variables 
We construct a number of variables that will be included as controls in the regression 
models. Consistent with the literature on patents (e.g. Galasso and Simcoe, 2011), we start 
with taking the logarithm of firm revenues (Ln Sales), and the logarithm of the capital to 
labor ratio (Capital to labor), computed as property, plants and equipment divided by 
employees. We also construct the logarithm of firm age (Ln Firm age), proxied by the 
number of years a firm has been in Compustat, to control for differences in the stage of 
development across firms. As written above, Execucomp covers the 5 highest-paid 
executives, but a few firms report compensation for a few more executives. We are aware 





the values of the dispersion ratio. For instance, the ratio could take a lower value for a firm 
that reports compensation only for the CEO and the CFO (usually the executives with the 
highest pay), as compared to a firm that reports compensation for several more executives 
(thus including the low-end of the pay distribution). In the empirical analysis, we 
explicitly account for this potential problem by controlling for the number of executives 
used to compute the dispersion ratios (Ln number executives). Finally, we construct two 
variables at the CEO level that may correlate with both compensation structures and 
innovation, and thus confound our results. These are the logarithm of CEO age (Ln CEO 
age) and the logarithm of the years the CEO has worked in the firm (Ln CEO experience). 
Summary statistics are presented in the bottom part of Table 1.  
 
4. Results 
4.1. Summary statistics 
The correlation table is reported in Table 1, while summary statistics are presented in 
Table 2, which includes the dispersion ratio in terms of total pay, as well as separately for 
fixed and variable items.  
[[ INSERT Table 1 about Here ]] 
[[ INSERT Table 2 about Here ]] 
From Table 1, it can be noted the positive correlation between the total 
compensation gap and its specific components, but also a positive correlation between 
fixed and variable compensation gaps. However – being relatively low – this correlation 
does not raise concerns of multicollinearity. 
 





Our goal is to estimate the effect of executive compensation dispersion on a firm’s 
innovation activities. To this end, we follow the literature (e.g. Hausman et al., 1984) and 
assume that the expected number of patents is an exponential function of the explanatory 
variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡. More specifically, we estimate a Poisson model with conditional mean: 
E[Yit | Xit] = exp(δ + βCompensation gapit + γ'Zit + αi + αt) 
in which the dependent variable is, alternatively, the raw patent count or the count of 
truncation-adjusted patent cites for a firm i at times t. Consistent with existing works that 
have documented a relatively short lag between innovative investments and patenting (e.g. 
Hall et al., 1986), we use current values (i.e. dated at time t) of both dependent and 
explanatory variables. However, we will show that our results hold using lagged rather 
than current explanatory variables.  
 The key explanatory variables included in the Xit vector are the compensation gaps 
of firm i at times t. Here we include the fixed and variable compensation gaps in the same 
model. In robustness checks, we verify that our findings hold if the two variables are 
separately included. The vector Xit further includes a host of controls to mitigate the 
concern of omitted factor bias, as well as αi and αt that represent, respectively, firm fixed 
effects, used to absorb firm-specific and time-invariant heterogeneity, and year dummies, 
which absorb overall trends in innovation. 
Following existing works based on innovation counts (e.g. Amore et al., 2013; 
Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Simcoe et al., 2009), we estimate the model using the Quasi-
Maximum-Likelihood (QMLE) method, which has the advantage of providing consistent 
estimates as long as the conditional mean is correctly specified even if the true underlying 
distribution is not Poisson. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, which is deemed 





with panel data); yet, in untabulated checks we have validated our results using industry or 
state-level clustering, as well as estimating the model with a negative binomial regression. 
 
4.3. Main results 
Our theory suggests that the dispersion measured by using total compensation masks the 
two opposite effects coming from its variable and fixed components, ultimately resulting 
in this lack of significance. We tease out the two opposite effects in Table 3, Columns 1 
and 2, which include the fixed and variable pay dispersion ratios as separate explanatory 
variables. As expected, the two coefficients in Column (1) are statistically significant and 
display opposite signs: a greater dispersion in fixed compensation has a negative effect on 
patent counts (-0.043; p=0.012), whereas a greater dispersion in variable compensation 
has a positive effect (0.0003; p=0.007). These findings hold true even considering patent 
cites instead of patent counts as dependent variable (Column 2).  Hypotheses 1a and 1b 
are thus fully confirmed. 
[[ INSERT Table 3 about Here ]] 
To validate that the proposed relationship between pay dispersion, with its fixed or 
variable components, and innovative output hinge on the mechanisms described 
theoretically in Section 2, we compute additional pay dispersion measures by only using 
the executives formally involved in innovation activities. This approach increases the 
consistency with our theoretical framework since it restricts the analysis to lower-paid 
executives that undertake activities directly related to the dependent variable of interest 
(i.e. patent counts and citation counts). To this end, we compute the ratio of the highest 
executive pay to the pay of executive specifically involved in the innovation activities (see 
Section 3.3. for details). Results, reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4, show 





coefficients are economically larger, possibly owing to the fact that the restriction to 
innovation executives magnifies the effect of pay dispersions on innovation.  
We further validate our findings by excluding stock options from the computation 
of the variable dispersion ratio. The rationale behind this exclusion is that stock option 
value may be contaminated by stock price fluctuations and thus only indirectly reflect 
individual executives’ effort provision. Results, reported in Columns (3) and (4) display 
again coefficients strongly in line with our main hypotheses. 
[[ INSERT Table 4 about Here ]] 
In the Appendix, we confirm our main result with an extensive set of robustness 
checks. For instance, we show that our results are largely unaffected by outliers, that they 
hold controlling for a broader set of explanatory variables, that they are not influenced by 
sample composition concerns, and that simultaneity concerns do not bias significantly our 
results. 
 Before conclusion, we establish that our results are driven by changes in the 
provision of innovative inputs. This is important to further validate our argument that the 
effects on patenting documented so far are indeed driven by changes in innovative effort. 
Following existing approaches, we construct a measure of R&D intensity by taking the 
ratio of a firm’s R&D expenditures to revenues; to account for the presence of missing 
R&D items, we replace missing observations with the average R&D by 3-digit SIC code 
and year and further include as explanatory variable a dummy equal to one for missing 
R&D and zero for non-missings. We then estimate a OLS model employing the same set 
of controls of the previous analyses, together with an interaction between our key pay 
dispersion ratios and a dummy identifying high-R&D industries (i.e. equal to one if the 
annual average ratio of R&D to sales of a given 3-digit SIC code is above the sample 





[[ INSERT Table 5 about Here ]] 
 Results reported in Table 5 indicate a negative interaction between high-R&D 
industry and fixed pay dispersion; by contrast, the interaction with variable pay dispersion 
turns positive and significant. Although the statistical significance of the interaction terms 
is lower than that of our previous results, the sign and magnitude of these coefficients 
provide a useful validation of our theoretical arguments. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Following recent calls to better understand the relationship between intra-firm pay 
dispersion and firm results (Trevor et al., 2012; Connelly et al., 2016; Ridge et al., 2017) 
and the role of alternative tournament reward structures (Kelly and Presslee, 2017), we 
investigate the nexus between corporate innovation and dispersion in fixed or variable 
executive pay. We concentrate on a firm’s innovation activities as outcome of interest, 
given its high sensitivity to executives’ coordination and effort provision as well as its 
importance for firm performance. 
 We contend that executive pay dispersion can act as a double-edged sword for 
innovation activities: on the one hand, it can promote effort provision, coordination and 
good team dynamics among top executives involved in innovation processes (e.g. Kale et 
al., 2009); on the other hand, it can trigger affective conflicts and make executives 
unwilling to exert effort, share knowledge and cooperate (e.g. Carpenter and Sanders, 
2004; Fredrickson et al., 2010). While the literature has long argued that social 
comparison and tournament theory can be important theoretical frameworks to explain the 
implications of executive compensation (O’Reilly III et al., 1988), scholars have only 
recently begun to integrate these theories (Shaw et al., 2002; Trevor et al., 2012; Ridge et 





Ganzach, 2009), we posit that whether the negatives or the positives of executive pay 
dispersion on innovation prevail would depend on the type of pay dispersion, i.e. fixed or 
variable pay dispersion. We build on the idea that dispersion in variable pay – being 
largely designed to respond to individual effort (Shaw et al., 2002; Suchman, 1995) – is 
more likely to be perceived as equitable (Trevor et al., 2012). As such, variable pay 
dispersion can spur work effort provision and organizational commitment, coordination 
and learning as lower-paid executives can try to directly fill the pay gap with higher-paid 
peers; this, in turn, will result in higher innovative outcomes. By contrast, a pronounced 
dispersion in fixed pay may foster the negative effects of social comparisons because 
increased effort does not directly affect fixed pay, which would in turn imply executives’ 
unwillingness to coordinate and share knowledge with each other; in combination, these 
effects will harm a firm’s innovative performance. 
Consistent with the hypotheses we set forth, our empirical investigation of US 
firms’ patenting activities confirms that executive pay dispersion does lead to antithetic 
effects on firm innovation: high dispersion in fixed compensation is associated with fewer 
patents and of lower quality (as measured by forward citations), whereas high dispersion 
in variable compensation is associated with higher number of patents and of better quality. 
Documenting these associations helps reconcile the opposite existing views on 
executive compensation dispersion and business outcomes. Our study connects the two 
main research streams on pay dispersion and documents their simultaneous validity in the 
context of corporate innovation.  Our contribution is thus twofold. First, we study the 
effects of pay dispersion on corporate innovation outcomes, an important channel behind 
the dispersion-performance relationship documented in previous studies. Second, we 
operationalize the distinction between fixed and variable pay in connection with pay at the 





from high pay dispersion. We also go beyond the analysis of executives generically 
considered and show that our results are magnified when the consistency between job 
titles and corporate outcomes is greater. 
Our study has important implications for the growing academic and practitioner 
debates on the importance of pay inequality at the apex of firms (e.g. Bebchuck et al., 
2011) and the role of tournaments as incentive devices (e.g. Newman and Tafkov, 2014; 
Rankin and Sayre, 2011). To the extent that our findings are driven by a firm’s optimal 
compensation choices, they suggest that large fixed pay dispersion can be applied in low-
tech contexts, whereas large variable pay dispersion is best suited for innovative firms. 
Moreover, our results suggest that executive compensation schemes and corporate 
outcomes should be examined by considering the importance of relative and not just 
absolute compensation levels (e.g. Carpenter and Sanders, 2002, 2004). Going beyond the 
analysis of CEO pay in isolation, we highlight the importance of relative pay across the 
entire structure of executive teams, and propose that relative pay effects are especially 
important given that innovation activities require cooperation and knowledge sharing 
between a firm’s key decision makers (especially those directly involved in the innovation 
process). Finally, this paper suggests that it is crucial to pay special attention to the 
specific forms of remuneration, again not just in isolation but also in relative terms, 
towards the difficult task of motivating executives and spur corporate innovation activities.  
 Our study is not without limitations, which we acknowledge before concluding. 
The first has to do with the fact that, despite having carried out a comprehensive host of 
robustness tests and produced evidence consistent with a causal interpretation, we cannot 
rule out that some unobserved factor could bias our results. The second limitation, which 
is also a promising avenue for future research, relates to the fact that we have not 





governance mechanisms in shaping innovative outcomes. Future studies could introduce 
corporate governance or institutional moderators. Finally, we acknowledge that our study 
adopts patent data, which have a number of well-known advantages over accounting-
based items such as R&D expenses, but are certainly imperfect measures of innovation. 
We did offer some validation tests using R&D expenditures using R&D information from 
archival sources, but future studies could further explore this aspect by adopting finer-
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  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Patent counts 
          
2. Citation counts 0.91*** 
         3. Ln (Sale) 0.25*** 0.21*** 
        4. Capital to labor 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.19*** 
       5. Ln (Firm age) 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.53*** 0.17*** 
      6. Ln (CEO age) 0.04*** 0.02 0.26*** 0.12*** 0.25*** 
     7. Ln (CEO experience) 0.01 -0.01 0.24*** 0.13*** 0.32*** 0.35*** 
    8. Ln (number executives) 0.01 0.01 0.16*** 0.05*** 0.09*** -0.04*** 0.05*** 
   9. Total compensation gap 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07*** -0.15*** -0.07*** 0.15*** 
  10. Fixed compensation gap -0.01 -0.01 0.05*** 0.01 0.03 -0.05*** 0.03 0.20*** 0.35*** 
 11. Variable compensation gap -0.01 -0.01 -0.08*** -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.07*** 0.08*** 0.41*** 0.17*** 
 






Table 2.  
Summary statistics 
 
  Average s.d. Median 
Patent counts 35.523 174.165 1 
Citation counts 592.181 3568.829 0 
Ln (Sale) 7.278 1.729 7.276 
Capital to labor 3.922 1.150 3.723 
Ln (Firm age) 3.081 0.736 3.178 
Ln (CEO age) 4.007 0.132 4.025 
Ln (CEO experience) 2.531 0.922 2.708 
Ln (number executives) 1.647 0.162 1.609 
Total compensation gap 5.785    6.874 3.975 
Fixed compensation gap 2.929    1.870 2.544 





















   
 (1) (2) 
Fixed compensation gap -4.32* -7.28** 
 (1.72) (2.67) 
Variable compensation gap 0.03** 0.05** 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Ln (Sales) 0.51*** 0.53*** 
 (0.10) (0.08) 
Capital to labor 0.04 0.13 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
Ln (Firm age) 0.64* 0.47 
 (0.30) (0.26) 
Ln (CEO age) 0.07 0.09 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Ln (CEO tenure) 0.63 0.47 
 (0.44) (0.49) 
Ln (executives number) -0.28* -0.31* 
 (0.14) (0.15) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 4502 4162 
 
Firm-clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
* corresponds to p-value<0.1 
** corresponds to p-value<0.05 



































    
 




gap as cash bonus 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Fixed compensation gap -32.15* -26.51  -4.00 -5.60* 
 (14.54) (15.69)  (2.23) (2.64) 
Variable compensation gap 0.06** 0.10***  0.99*** 1.01*** 
 (0.02) (0.03)  (0.28) (0.24) 
Ln (Sales) -0.27 -0.13  0.53*** 0.61*** 
 (0.15) (0.20)  (0.10) (0.09) 
Capital to labor -0.17 0.02  0.03 0.13 
 (0.22) (0.21)  (0.10) (0.10) 
Ln (Firm age) 0.70 -1.73  0.53 0.39 
 (0.95) (0.97)  (0.30) (0.26) 
Ln (CEO age) 0.64** 1.98*  0.09 0.12* 
 (0.22) (0.78)  (0.06) (0.05) 
Ln (CEO tenure) -2.66*** -5.30  0.60 0.40 
 (0.72) (2.74)  (0.47) (0.44) 
Ln (executives number) -0.08 0.01  -0.44* -0.45** 
 (0.67) (0.64)  (0.17) (0.17) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 356 299  3251 3023 
 
Firm-clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
* corresponds to p-value<0.1 
** corresponds to p-value<0.05 




















Table 5.  
Effect on R&D intensity in innovative and non-innovative contexts 
 
Dependent variable: R&D intensity  
 (1) 
Fixed compensation gap 0.01 
 (0.35) 
Fixed compensation gap×High-R&D industries -1.57* 
 (0.87) 
Variable compensation gap -0.01 
 (0.01) 
Variable compensation gap×High-R&D industries 0.03* 
 (0.02) 
Table-4 controls Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes 
Observations 4,703 
 
Firm-clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
* corresponds to p-value<0.1 
** corresponds to p-value<0.05 










In this section, we confirm our results using a variety of robustness checks. Results, which 
replicate the specification of Table 3, are reported in Table A1. As shown, all of our 
results remain economically and statistically significant.  
 In Column 1, we augment our specification with the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, 
computed using the distribution of firm revenues at the 3-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) level, and its squared term in order to take into account the effect of 
competition on innovation. While our specification absorbs overall trends in innovation by 
the inclusion of year dummies, it does not control for industry-specific trends in 
innovation. To control for this additional factor, in Column 2, we augment our 
specification with the average of the dependent variable computed at the year and 3-digit 
SIC level, after excluding the focal firm. In Column 3 we control for geographic trends 
including the average of the dependent variable computed by year and State of 
headquarter, and, in Column 4, we include together industry and state trend variables. 
Next, we deal with sample composition concerns. We start, in Column 5, by 
excluding the last sample years (i.e. 2005 and 2006), which can be problematic due to 
severe truncation problems in citations and patent applications. We move on by trimming, 
in Column 6, 1% of observations on the right tails of the patent count distribution to 
mitigate concerns of influential observations. Similarly, in Column 7 we trim a further 1% 
of observations (in addition to the 0.5% already trimmed in the variable construction) to 
the left and right tail of the dispersion ratios. To further reduce the concern that of extreme 
values due to e.g. extremely short tenures, in untabulated regressions we check our results 
using firms in which the CEO has been present in the firm for at least one year. This test 





In Columns 8 and 9, we check that our results are not driven solely by the smallest 
firms, which can be exhibit intensive innovative activity post-IPO due to intense equity 
issuances, or by the largest firms, typically endowed with a large stock of innovative 
knowledge; to this end, we remove firms in the bottom or top 2.5% of the sales 
distribution. In Column 10, we limit our analysis primarily to the manufacturing sectors 
(SIC up to 4000).  
In conclusion, we verify the robustness to controlling for additional firm-specific 
variables that may confound our baseline evidence. In Column 11 we control for R&D 
spending by including the logarithm of R&D expenditures. In Column 12 we control for 
the return on assets (ROA), computed as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization to total assets, in order to control for differences in 
profitability across firms. In Column 13, we augment the model with firms’ market 
performance by including the market to book ratio, computed using the market value of 
equity divided by the book value of equity. In Column 14, we attempt to improve the 
causal interpretation of our results by using 1-year lagged dispersion ratios rather than 
contemporaneous ones; lagged values help ruling out the concern that it is firm patenting 
that affects the compensation dispersion rather than the other way around. 





Table A1.  
Robustness checks 
 
























 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variable compensation gap 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03** 0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Fixed compensation gap -3.60** -4.23** -4.53*** -4.36** -4.54*** -3.63** -6.45*** 
 (1.61) (1.75) (1.71) (1.73) (1.72) (1.56) (0.7) 
Table-4 controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 























 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Variable compensation gap 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03** 0.03* 0.03*** 0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Fixed compensation gap -4.21** -5.03*** -5.02*** -3.31** -2.90** -4.21** -2.90** 
 (1.67) (1.88) (1.82) (1.57) (1.43) (1.20) (1.43) 
Table-4 controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,390 4,358 3,584 3,407 4,487 4,505 3,657 
 
Firm-clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. * corresponds to p-value<0.1; ** corresponds to p-value<0.05; *** corresponds to p-value<0.01. 
